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We study how market conditions influence referrals of patients by general practitioners (GPs). 
We set up a model of GP referral for the Norwegian health care system, where a GP receives 
capitation payment based on the number of patients in his practice, as well as fee-for-service 
reimbursements. A GP may accept new patients or close the practice to new patients. We 
model GPs as partially altruistic, and compete for patients. We show that a GP operating in a 
more competitive market refers more. To retain patients in his practice, a GP satisfies 
patients’ requests for referrals. Furthermore, a GP who faces patient shortage will refer more 
often than a GP who has enough patients. More referrals may add to profits from future 
treatments. Using data of radiology referrals by GPs in Norway, we test and confirm our 
theory. 
 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Nonprice rationing is common in health care delivery systems. Managed care, supply management, and
gatekeeping are usual forms of rationing. In private health insurance markets in the United States, primary
care physicians often coordinate care for patients. Specialty care is available only when a primary care
physician refers the patient for such services. In many European countries, such gatekeeping is often the
responsibility of a General Practitioner (GP). In this paper, we model a GP’s referral decision, and assess
its empirical signiﬁcance.
We focus on GPs’ radiology and imaging referrals. These services are diagnostic in nature, and yield valu-
able information to the GP. Often a radiology referral is the beginning of medical treatments by specialists.
Radiology referrals by GPs are therefore key in cost control because specialty care uses more resource.
We study the factors that aﬀect GPs’ radiology referral decisions. Naturally, one expects that variations
in patient characteristics would be correlated to the likelihood of referrals. Nevertheless, it is well known
that these variations do not fully explain referrals. In this paper, we study how physician characteristics and
local physician market conditions aﬀect GPs’ radiology referrals.
Our model is adapted for the Norwegian GP market. Since 2001, each inhabitant in Norway is listed
with a GP. The size of a GP’s practice is determined by a matching mechanism, and it is quite possible
that a GP may want more patients than he currently has in the practice. A GP facing patient shortage
may leave his practice open so that new patients may join. When the local physician market is competitive,
more GPs will have their practices open to new patients. We use the number of GPs with open practice in
a municipality as a measure of the intensity of competition. Furthermore, we also use the information of
whether a GP faces patient shortage to explain GPs’ radiology referrals.
A GP is paid according to a capitation fee per patient in the practice and fee-for-service reimbursements.
AG Pd o e sn o td i r e c t l yb e n e ﬁt from referring a patient to radiology services. Our understanding is that
Norwegian GPs have no ﬁnancial stake in radiology laboratories. A GP may gain indirectly because he
may provide more treatments to a patient after the radiology referral. Furthermore, radiology referrals may
increase patient satisfaction. This may help the GP to retain patients and to attract new patients.
1A GP’s preferences are a weighted sum of proﬁts and patient beneﬁt. These preferences are the key
linkage between the theoretical model and the empirical implementation. We posit that these weights are
inﬂuenced by market conditions. When the physician market is more competitive, the weight on patient
beneﬁt is assumed to be higher. A GP who has to compete against more rival GPs has a more liberal
referral rule. The GP relaxes his gatekeeping rule to increase patient satisfaction level, preventing patients
from leaving, and attracting new ones.
We consider as well the eﬀect of patient shortage on referrals. A GP who faces patient shortage will have
a higher referral rate than a GP who does not. This result is simply due to cost consideration. If GPs have
increasing marginal costs, a GP with enough patients in his practice will reduce radiology referrals because
the marginal cost of a referral is higher than if he had experienced a shortage of patients.
We test the predictions from the model with data on Norwegian GPs’ referrals to diagnostic radiology. We
have monthly radiology referral data at the individual physician level from 2004 to 2007. Our (unbalanced)
panel consists of over 4,200 GPs, and over 165,000 referrals. The data set is unique since it includes
information of all GPs in the Norwegian list patient system. We merge the referral data with data of
physicians, so have information about physicians and their practices. Having practice size information, we
can use a standardized dependent variable of referral rate per 1,000 patients.
Since each GP is likely to have his own practice style, observations of an individual GP are correlated
over time. We estimate the contributions of potential explanatory variables by panel data methods, and
control for unobserved heterogeneity by random eﬀects and ﬁxed eﬀects.
First, we conﬁrm that market conditions have the expected eﬀects on radiology referrals. In a municipality
with more open GP practices, a GP tends to refer more patients for radiology services. Second, we also
conﬁrm that a GP who faces a patient shortage refers more. Third, our empirical ﬁndings are consistent
with common expectations: the referral rate declines with the distance between a GP and a radiology
laboratory, GPs refer more when their patients are older, GPs with more female patients refer more, as do
older GPs.
GP characteristics and market conditions contribute to the referral rate. The magnitude, though sta-
2tistically signiﬁcant, does not seem to be large. Suppose we compare two municipalities, one with 0 open
GP practice, and one about 50 open practices, which corresponds roughly to the 75th percentile in ranking
of municipalities with open practices. According to our estimates, the diﬀerence is 1.11 referrals per 1000
patients per month, just under a 9.5 percent increase from the mean referral rate.
An on-going health policy debate concerns the substitution of secondary care providers by primary care
providers. This is usually regarded as a cost-saving strategy. By increasing the number of GPs, policy
makers hope to reduce the use of more expensive specialists. The results here do not lend support to the
cost-saving goal. When there are more GPs, competition becomes more intense, and increases radiology
referrals, usually the gateway to specialty care. Our study is on radiology referral only, so it may not oﬀer
a comprehensive evaluation of the cost-saving argument.
Many papers in the health economics literature are on the relationship between ﬁnancial incentives
and such aspects of the health market as outcomes, costs, quantities and qualities. Physicians’ responses
against policy changes have been studied extensively (McGuire 2000, Leger 2008). Our paper here is on the
relationship between gatekeeping and ﬁnancial incentives, and the literature is smaller. Our study does not
involve a policy implementation of new ﬁnancial incentives. Rather, it follows a panel of physicians over a
period of four years.
Gatekeeping by primary care physicians has been shown to be responsive to ﬁnancial incentives. Dusheiko,
Gravelle, Jacobs, and Smith (2006) study the United Kingdom fund holding natural experiment. Between
1991-1999, UK GPs who opted for a fund holding scheme were paid according to capitation, and responsible
for their patients’ elective surgery charges. These GPs have an incentive to avoid referring patients for such
services.1 Dusheiko et al. show that the abolition of fund holding has increased elective surgery admission
rates between 3.5% and 5.1%.
Croxson, Propper, and Perkins (2001) ﬁnd evidence that GPs in the UK do respond to ﬁnancial incentives.
They show that GPs have inﬂated cost for the time period before they become fundholders under capitation.
1In an experiment, Earwicker and Whynes (1998) show that GPs’ referral rates are more responsive to specialist
interests and waiting time than costs. Because the study consists of a questionaire survey, GPs do not actually have
to bear any costs.
3Rochaix (1993) presents evidence for Quebec GPs responding to a price freeze during a ﬁfteen month period
by adjusting quantities. Generally, the evidence that physicians respond to ﬁnancial incentives is widely
accepted.
The ﬁnancial incentives in Dusheiko et. al. and Croxson et. al. come directly from service capitation. In
Rochaix (1993) GPs’ reimbursement rates have been restrained. All three studies, as most in the literature,
use a natural experiment, a policy change, to identify physicians’ responses to changes in ﬁnancial incentives.
Any changes in market conditions then occur simultaneously with policy changes. By contrast, in our study,
all GPs in the panel are subject to a common and time-invariant payment and capitation policy. The panel
structure allows us to use exogenous market condition changes to identify GPs’ responses.
The theoretical GP referral and gatekeeping literature in health economics has studied such issues as
cream skimming (Barros and Olivella 2005), quality (Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume 2007), GP reputation
and human capital investment (Gonzalez 2004), eﬃcient use of information (Gonzalez 2009), and dual job
incentives (Biglaiser and Ma 2007). The managed care literature (Glied 2000) has also considered the
gatekeeping and referral role of GPs (Malcomson 2004), and diagnostic information and incentives (Allard,
Jelovac, and Leger 2008). Except in Brekke et. al., these studies assume a ﬁxed set of market conditions. In
Brekke et. al. competition among specialists is studied in a model of referral under incomplete information.
In our paper, market conditions vary exogenously, but we let GPs respond to market conditions by their
referral decisions.
Our empirical implementation uses Norwegian GP data. Iversen and Lurås (2000) model a GP who
decides on the number of patients in his practice and referrals of patients to specialists. A trial that began
in 1993 for four municipalities replaced a GP’s practice allowance by a capitation based on the practice size.
Iversen and Lurås predict that this payment change would lead to a higher referral rate due to GPs shifting
treatment costs to specialists. Norwegian data for one municipality before and after the introduction of
capitation support the predictions.
Structured focus group interviews with Norwegian GPs by Carlsen and Norheim (2003) collaborate with
the statistical results in Iversen and Lurås. The GPs generally perceived themselves as less concerned with
4the gatekeeper role under (partial) capitation scheme, and felt it more important to provide better services
and keep patients satisﬁed. Lurås (2007) analyzes a survey of a representative sample of Norwegians on their
satisfaction with their GPs. The satisfaction indexes include GP’s interpersonal skills, medical skills, referral
practices, and consultation lengths. Lurås ﬁnds that patients listed with GPs with patient shortage were less
satisﬁed in all these dimensions than those listed with GPs with enough patients. Our paper complements
these studies on the Norwegian health care system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes parts of the Norwegian health
care system relevant to our study. Section 3 presents a model of GP patient lists and referrals, as well as its
predictions. Section 4 describes the data and summary statistics. The main regression results and robustness
checks are in Section 5. The last section draws some conclusions.
2 Study Setting
Norway provides health care to its 4.5 million citizens by a national health service. Primary care physicians
are mostly private practitioners, while hospitals are publicly owned with salaried physicians. The Regular
General Practitioner Scheme implemented in 2001 requested that each inhabitant of Norway be listed with
a General Practitioner (GP), a primary care physician. Over 95 percent of the population complied with the
request. In a nonemergency episode of illness, a patient’s initial medical services are provided by the GP.
Secondary and specialty services require a GP’s referral. Thus, besides providing medical services, the GP
is a gatekeeper.2
About 90 percent of GPs are self-employed and contract with municipalities, and the remaining GPs are
directly employed by municipalities. In 2004, a GP on average had between 1250 and 1300 patients listed in
his or her practice. The establishment of a GP’s patient list when the Regular General Practitioner Scheme
started in 2001 is described as follows. First, each GP submits to the National Insurance Administration
the maximum number of patients he is willing to take. Simultaneously, each inhabitant submits to the
2A patient may be able to obtain second opinions from a provider other than his or her own GP. In some cases,
for example, when the patient is unable to get an appointment from the listed GP due to vacations or long waits, the
patient can obtain services from another GP.
5Administration up to three preferred physicians. Second, a matching process respecting patients’ and GPs’
preferences form an initial patient list for a GP. Third, if a GP’s maximum list size has been reached, his list
is complete. If the initial match assigns less than a GP’s maximum number of patients, the Administration
then assigns to the GP inhabitants who have not submitted physician preferences. In 2001, 30 percent of
the adult population did not submit any physician preferences. In June 2001, after this second round of
assignments, about 30 percent of the GPs still had at least 100 patients less than their maximum number of
patients. Some GPs may experience patient shortage.
In any year, a patient may switch GPs up to two times. A GP can announce whether his practice is open
to new patients or not. A GP who already has the maximum number of patients may close his practice to
new patients. The information on whether practices are open or closed to new patients is publicly available
through the internet, or from the municipality.
In terms of out-of-pocket expenses, in 2006 a patient’s copayments for an outpatient visit with a primary
care physician and a specialist are respectively about US$25 and US$40. If within a year a patient’s copay-
ment exceeds US$250, National Insurance Administration pays for the excess copayment. For a radiology
consult, in addition to a copayment of US$30, a patient will incur both time and transportation costs. In
major cities, there may be many laboratories or hospitals where radiology and imaging facilities are available.
In remote areas, however, such facilities may be less commonly available, and consumers may have to incur
higher travel costs to fulﬁll a radiology referral.
A primary care physician earns three sources of income. First, a GP receives from the municipality
a capitation payment for each patient listed with him. The capitation payment is not subject to risk
adjustments. Second, a GP receives fee-for-service payments from National Insurance. Third, a GP receives
patients’ copayments. Each of the three components makes up about one third of a GP’s practice income.
Radiology and imaging services in Norway are provided by public and private laboratories. Public
laboratories are service departments of public hospitals. Private laboratories are for-proﬁtc o m p a n i e s . I n
either case, radiologists or trained medical personnel perform the procedures, and radiology reports are sent
to the referring physicians. As far as we are aware, GPs in Norway do not have ﬁnancial stakes or ownership
6in private radiology laboratories, although there is no legal restriction on partnership or joint ownership.
Neither do we know of any contracts that specify payments from laboratories to GPs based on their radiology
and imaging referrals.
Private laboratories charge patients copayments, and bill National Insurance for fees. With a referral a
patient pays the same copayment whether he uses a public or private laboratory. A private laboratory must
have a contract with a Regional Health Authority (RHA) to bill National Insurance Administration. The
contract speciﬁes the volume an RHA is prepared to pay for, and a payment amount. This revenue for a
private laboratory is in addition to fees from National Insurance and patient copayment. If a laboratory
provides services in excess of the contracted volume with an RHA, no extra payment will be received from the
RHA, although the laboratory still receives reimbursement from National Insurance and patient copayment.
Many public and private radiology laboratories operate in major urban centers. The density of public
laboratories in major cities is comparable to that of private laboratories. In rural areas, public hospitals are
often the only facilities where imaging referrals can be served. A GP has the choice of referring a patient
to a public laboratory or a private laboratory that has a contract with an RHA. In major cities private
laboratories are often more convenient to patients because of shorter waiting and travel times, as well as
longer opening hours. Some public laboratories ration their services and do not accept ordinary referrals
from primary care physicians. Nevertheless, for patients with more complicated or uncommon imaging and
radiology procedures, laboratories in public hospitals may be more suitable. In any case, the typical referral
seems more likely to be one for a private laboratory, and variations in market conditions for GPs will aﬀect
variations in referral rates to private labs.
3 A Model of Referral and Patient List
In this section we set up a model of radiology referral and patient list. The model will adopt many of the
institutional features in the Norwegian general practitioner (GP) market. According to the National Insur-
ance Administration, 99 percent of Norwegian residents are listed with a GP. The GP is also a gatekeeper;
secondary services require a GP’s referral. We focus on radiology and imaging referrals. We also model the
7GP’s choice of optimal practice size.
We proceed in two steps. First, we analyze a GP’s referral decision given the number of patients he has
in the practice. Second, given the optimal referral decisions, we study the GP’s choice of practice size. We
focus on radiology referral. We normalize the demand for radiology services and assume that each patient
in the GP’s practice potentially requires a referral.
In an initial diagnostic visit, the GP obtains some information about a patient’s expected beneﬁtf r o ma
radiology referral. The GP also learns the cost the patient has to incur to follow through with the referral.
The beneﬁt information comes from the GP’s assessment of the patient’s medical condition, the likelihood
that an imaging referral will yield useful information, and plans of further treatment after imaging results.
The cost information refers to the patient’s copayment, time and travel cost, as well as any relevant cost due
to the referral.
The radiology referral may lead to further treatments, but negative imaging results may also indicate
that no new services are needed. We do not model explicitly the continuing treatment process. Instead,
we simply use a parameter β to represent the expected beneﬁt from a treatment episode beginning with a
radiology referral.3 Let β denote the net expected beneﬁt from a radiology referral. Expected beneﬁts vary
across patients in the practice, so we let β be random and follow the distribution F with density f on an
interval, which will be deﬁned shortly.
To the GP, a referral yields an expected net revenue S, and we allow this to depend on the patient’s
expected beneﬁt β. The expected net revenue S(β) summarizes potential patient copayments and fee-for-
service reimbursements from National Insurance, and the GP’s costs from the continuing treatment episode
after the radiology referral. We do not have to impose stringent restrictions on the function S, but it likely
follows an inverted U-shape. For low expected patient net beneﬁts, the intensity of treatment may be low,
and the GP expects to have a low net monetary return. For high expected patient net beneﬁts, the GP
may have to refer the patient to a specialist, and again, the net monetary return to the GP will be low. For
medium values of expected patient net beneﬁts, the GP will likely continue to provide treatments, and the
3This is suﬃcient for our purpose because we do not have data on patients’ medical conditions at the time of the
referral, or treatments after the referral decisions.
8net monetary return will be high.
Suppose that there are n patients in the GP’s practice. Each patient’s expected net beneﬁt from a referral
β is drawn independently from F. After an initial visit, the patient and the GP both learn the realization of
β. Then the GP may suggest a referral and the patient will decide whether to follow through. We assume
that the patient will accept a referral only if the net expected beneﬁt is positive. We model the GP’s referral
decision by a net beneﬁt threshold b β: he recommends a referral if and only if β ≥ b β. Because of the patient’s
reaction, we let b β ≥ 0. The total number of referrals is n(1−F(b β)). There is therefore no loss of generality,
if we let β vary on the interval [0,1]; any negative realization of β would not lead to a radiology consult.
The GP incurs monetary and time costs from referrals. These costs are due to the time and eﬀort needed
to read reports and communicate with radiologists, etc. We call this the eﬀort cost due to referrals. Given
that there are n patients who demand referrals and the referral threshold b β,t h ee ﬀort cost is C(n(1−F(b β))),
where C is a positive, strictly increasing and strictly convex function.




S(β) f(β) dβ − C(n(1 − F(b β)));
the ﬁrst term is the monetary revenue, whereas the second term is the eﬀort cost. We, however, model the
physician’s behavior as guided by the utility function
U(b β;n,S,θ) ≡ n
Z 1
e β




Besides the GP’s revenue and eﬀort, expression (1) includes a product of the patient’s expected net surplus
and a parameter θ.
How do we interpret the utility function in (1)? We hypothesize that the GP’s referral threshold is
aﬀected by market conditions. One can think of market conditions determining a bargaining outcome
between physicians and patients. The bargaining outcome is given by the maximization of a weighted sum
of the GP’s payoﬀ and the patient’s surplus. Market conditions inﬂuence the weight on patient surplus. In a
more competitive market, a GP will have less bargaining power because the patient may switch to another
GP, and therefore the value of θ tends to be higher. In our empirical work, we use market conditions to
9identify θ.
The GP’s optimal choice of the referral threshold b β can be characterized as follows. The ﬁrst-order
derivative of (1) is
h
−S(b β) − θb β + C0(n(1 − F(b β)))
i
f(b β)n.
At an interior solution, the value of b β is set where the weighted sum of the GP’s and the patient’s marginal
beneﬁts, S(b β)+θb β, is equal to the marginal eﬀort cost C0(n(1 − F(b β))). At a corner solution, b β i ss e ta t0
so that all patients with positive expected beneﬁts will receive a referral.
How does the threshold b β change with respect to the number of patients in the practice n and the market
condition parameter θ? Applying the implicit function theorem on the ﬁrst-order condition (at the interior
solution),4 we obtain the following:
• A GP decreases radiology referrals when the number of patient in his practice increases; ∂b β/∂n > 0.
• A GP increases radiology referrals when the weight on patient beneﬁti n c r e a s e s :∂b β/∂θ < 0.
These results follow directly from beneﬁt and cost considerations. A higher θ increases the concern for
patient beneﬁt, and induces the GP to lower the referral threshold, raising the number of referrals. When n
increases, the GP’s marginal cost increases, which reduces referrals.
Next, we turn to the GP’s decision on the optimal practice size. We begin by deﬁning the optimized
value of (1):









The value function V (n) is the GP’s payoﬀ from having n patients in his practice when he chooses the
optimal referral threshold. In the Norwegian system, the GP receives a capitation fee for each patient in the
practice. Let R denote the capitation fee. If the GP has n patients, his total payoﬀ is V (n)+nR,w h i c hw e
assume strictly quasi-concave.
4The sign of the derivative of the optimal referral threshold e β with respect to a parameter (n and θ)i st h es a m ea s
the sign of the cross partial derivative of the objective function (1) with respect to e β and the parameter. Generally, if
x(θ) = argmaxx f(x;θ), then, by the implicit function theorem, x
0(θ)=−fxθ/fxx.a n dt h es i g no fx
0(θ) is the same
as the sign of fxθ(x,θ), by the second-order necessary condition for a maximum.
10If the GP were able to choose the practice size, he would choose it to maximize V (n)+nR.I n t h e
Norwegian system, however, the GP is only able to specify the desired practice size. Patients specify their
preferences on GPs to National Health Insurance, and a central matching mechanism allocates patients to
each GP. A GP may be assigned more or less than his desired number of patients. We assume that if a GP is
assigned more than the desired number of patients for his practice, he rejects the excess number of patients.
If he is assigned less than his desired number, then that becomes his practice size; we call this case patient
shortage.
In the short run, a GP may not be able to inﬂuence the demand from patients who want to be listed
with him. For a GP, we model patients’ demand for listing with him as a random variable. Let N be a
random variable with support on the positive real number, and distribution G and density g.T h en u m b e r
of patients who want to be listed with a GP is a realization of N . Suppose that the GP chooses a desired
practice size, b N, which is the limit of his practice size. If N<b N, the GP’s practice size is N.I fN>b N,
t h eG P ’ sp r a c t i c es i z ei s b N.







V ( b N)+ b NR
i
g(N)dN. (3)
The ﬁrst-order derivative of (3) is
h
V ( b N)+ b NR
i
g( b N) −
h




V 0( b N)+R
i
(1 − G( b N))
=
h
V 0( b N)+R
i
(1 − G( b N)). (4)
The value of (4) vanishes if and only if b N =a r g m a x N V (N)+NR≡ N∗. The optimal practice size limit is
o n et h a tt h eG Pw o u l dh a v ec h o s e ni fh ew a sa b l et op i c kt h ep r a c t i c es i z ef r e e l y .
The result captures the following intuition. Suppose that the GP sets a practice size limit b N below N∗.
There are two possibilities. If N turns out to be less than b N, the payoﬀ would not be aﬀected by any small
change in the practice limit. If N is more than b N, the GP would have increased his payoﬀ by a small increase
in b N.S e t t i n gb N below N∗ is suboptimal. Now suppose that the GP sets a practice size limit b N above N∗.
If N is below b N,t h eG P ’ sp a y o ﬀ is unaﬀected by any small change in b N.I fN is above b N,t h eG Pw o u l d
11have increased his payoﬀ by a small decrease in b N. It is indeed optimal for the GP to report truthfully his
desired practice size. We summarize the result here:
• A GP optimally sets his desired practice size to the level he would have chosen if he were able to
choose the practice size without any demand constraint; b N = N∗ ≡ argmaxN V (N)+NR.T h e
optimal practice size limit is independent of the distribution of demand G.
Market conditions may aﬀect how likely a GP may face patient shortage. When the density of GPs
in a geographical market is high, the GP may likely be rationed. According to the comparative static
results above, he would recommend more radiology referral than a GP who does not face patient shortage.
Furthermore, in a more competitive market, a GP may have less bargaining power, so that the value of
θ tends to be higher. Both factors tend to raise a GP’s equilibrium referral rates. We summarize the
predictions of the model. Given a cost function C, distributions of referral beneﬁts and demand, respectively
F and G:
Prediction 1: A GP who faces patient shortage has a higher referral rate than a GP who does not.
Prediction 2: In a more competitive market, a GP is more likely to face patient shortage and to have less
bargaining power, and therefore has a higher referral rate.
We now discuss the robustness of our model. We have focused on radiology referrals; our data are on such
services. Including many services and referrals in the model would not involve any new conceptual issue.
We can imagine that these other services or referral decisions are at their respective optimal levels. Then we
can apply the comparative static results above. Furthermore, diﬀerences in patients’ health conditions can
be captured by altering the beneﬁt distribution function F.D i ﬀerences across municipalities and, hence,
overall demand for GPs can be captured by altering patient distributions G.
We do not distinguish between referrals to public and those to private laboratories, but the model can be
adapted for this distinction. Public laboratories are usually more appropriate for some medical conditions
or when travel distances to private laboratories are too long. We can let the GP’s referral decision be made
in two steps. First, the GP decides how the patient may beneﬁt from a diagnostic imaging test. In this ﬁrst
12step, based on the patient’s medical condition and location, the GP will have to consider whether a public
laboratory or a private laboratory is more appropriate. Second, after the assessment of the beneﬁti nt h eﬁrst
step, he has to decide whether to make the referral, based on his utility (which is partially determined by
the patient’s beneﬁt). For some medical conditions, public laboratories may be the only appropriate choice;
this may also be true for some remote locations. Otherwise, the GP may have more ﬂexibility in choosing
between referrals to public and private laboratories. In our empirical analysis, we study separately referrals
to private and public laboratories.
We have used a model with symmetric information. At the referral stage, the GP and the patient
share the same information. The basic incentives in the model remain the same when there is asymmetric
information. When the GP has more information, demand inducement becomes relevant. A patient may
infer the beneﬁt or cost of a referral from that recommendation. Nevertheless, along an equilibrium path, the
patient’s inference must be consistent with the GP’s private information. Because our comparative results
are based on simple utility maximization principles, we expect that the model predictions will continue to
hold in a more complex environment with some asymmetric information.
We have assumed that a GP’s demand is random. This is a natural assumption in the short run, say,
within a year or two. In the long run, a GP likely has a higher demand if he has a good reputation, so we
do expect that a GP will attempt to build reputation. By being more relaxed towards radiology referral,
a GP may raise patient satisfaction, which enhances his reputation. Furthermore, in a more competitive
environment, reputation should be more important. These considerations reinforce our results. We expect
that in the long run, more referrals will be associated with a more competitive GP market.
4 Descriptive statistics
Data for this study are from the Norwegian National Insurance Administration. Claims data from private
and public radiology laboratories are merged with information of referring physicians and characteristics of
the physicians’ municipalities. Only referrals from primary care physicians are included. Monthly numbers
of referrals by a physician are available for the four years between 2004 and 2007. The referrals are classiﬁed
13according to four modalities: X-ray, ultrasound, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), and computerized axial
tomography (CT Scan). Because we are primarily interested in incentives of private GPs, we exclude salaried
G P se m p l o y e db ym u n i c i p a l i t i e s ;t h i sh a sl e dt oa7p e r c e n tr e d u c t i o ni nt h en u m b e ro fo b s e r v a t i o n s .S a l a r i e d
GPs are mostly located in remote municipalities. Hence, even if we were interested in comparing private
GPs with salaried GPs, it would be diﬃcult to separate location and incentive eﬀects.
Since we use claims data from the laboratories to the National Insurance, referrals that patients have
refused are unavailable. Because we are interested in referrals due to competitive pressures and patients’
demands, we do not consider this omission to be problematic. Although we have information about physicians
and their practices, we do not have information about medical conditions of patients who have undergone
the radiology referrals.
The population distribution in Norway is scattered. There are a number of fairly densely populated urban
areas (such as Bergen, Oslo, and Trondheim), and many remote areas where long distances separate centers
of municipalities. Patients referred to radiology examinations experience considerable variations of travel
times depending on their locations. Since travel cost can be high, both in terms of transportation and time,
GPs should be sensitive to patients’ travel distances to their nearest radiology providers. We deﬁne the travel
time with respect to a referral by the distance between the GP’s municipality and the nearest laboratory’s
municipality. We use both travel times to private and public laboratories. Travel time is measured by the
driving time in hours for a small private car. A matrix that describes the travel times between Norwegian
municipalities in 2002 is provided by the private ﬁrm InfoMap Norge AS.
[Figure 1 about here.]
We deﬁne a GP’s monthly referral rate as the ratio of the number of radiology referrals to the number
of patients listed with him. We use a normalized referral rate per 1000 listed patients. Figure 1 shows
GP’s average monthly referral rates to public and private radiology laboratories. GPs’ referrals to public
and private laboratories relate diﬀerently to travel times. While GPs’ referral rates to private radiology
laboratories decline with travel times, the referral rates to public radiology in fact increase. The referral
rates intersect at a travel time of about one and a half hours. The sum of private and public referral rates
14is approximately independent of the travel time.
[Table 1 about here.]
Table 1 reports the time trend of GPs’ monthly referral rates to public and private laboratories. Both
have increased over our data period. Data for 2004 are believed to be somewhat incomplete, especially for
laboratories in public hospitals. Even disregarding 2004, we ﬁnd a 13 percent increase in referrals to private
radiology and a 17 percent increase in referrals to public radiology during the two years 2005-2007. There
are some seasonal eﬀects in our data. For example, GPs’ referral rates in July are up to 60 percent lower
than in November (this likely due to summer vacations). We will explain how we have handled the seasonal
components at the end of Section 5.
[Table 2 about here.]
Table 2 relates GPs’ referral rates to the number of other GPs in the same municipality who accept new
patients. The number of GPs with open lists is a measure of the degree of competition; patients dissatisﬁed
with their current GPs can only switch to GPs who accept new patients. When the number of GPs with
open list is large, we take it to mean that the GP market is more competitive. Relating to our model in
Section 3, we use the number of GPs with open lists in a municipality as a proxy for the parameter θ.
We have chosen to use administrative borders to deﬁne market boundaries. As an alternative, we could
count the number of GPs with open lists who are within a certain distance from a GP, and use that as
the extent of competition faced by the GP. This measure would be parallel to Propper, Burgess and Green
(2004), who deﬁne a hospital’s catchment area by a radius of thirty minutes of travel time, and measure
the extent of competition by the number of hospitals in the catchment area. In Norway, primary care is the
municipalities’ responsibilities, and the overwhelming majority of the population are listed with GPs in their
residential municipality. Therefore, administrative borders are appropriate for our study.
From Table 2, GPs’ private laboratory referral rates are positively correlated with the number of GPs
with open lists. Nevertheless, GPs’ referral rates to public laboratories exhibit the opposite correlation. The
15total referral rate increases by 12.6 percent as the number of open lists moves from the median to above the
90th percentile.
[Table 3 about here.]
Table 3 shows GPs’ monthly referral rates according to whether or not they experience shortage of
patients. A GP is said to experience a patient shortage if his actual list size is less than the maximum he has
reported to National Insurance Administration by at least 100. In our data, an average of 24 percent of GPs
have experienced patient shortage. The percentage of GPs with patient shortage is smaller in 2007 (21.9%)
than in 2004 (25.7%). This reduction results from a drop in the reported maximum list sizes and an increase
in the number of listed patients for some GPs. From Table 3, GPs who experience patient shortage refer
more patients to private laboratories than those who have enough patients, but refer less patients to public
laboratories. Nevertheless, the total referral rates are approximately equal between GPs who experience
shortage and those who do not.
[Table 4 about here.]
Table 4 shows some characteristics of GP practices and their municipalities. Our data consist of a panel
of GPs over a period of forty eight months, so in additional to the usual descriptives, we include between-GP
and within-GP variations.5 The monthly total number of referrals is 19.0 per 1000 patients. From the
columns that display between and within standard deviations we see that there are considerable variations
both across individuals and between periods. The average list size is 1235 people. On average, 11 percent of
the people listed are over 70 years old. Seventy percent of the GPs are male and the mean age of Norwegian
GPs is 48 years. On average there are 74.5 practices that accept additional patients in the municipalities
in the sample. This corresponds to a mean of 81 percent open lists. The mean travel time with car to the
nearest private laboratory is 1 hour and 3 minutes. The longest travel time is more than 18 hours. The
mean travel time to a public laboratory is 24 minutes with a maximum of 6 hours and 22 minutes.6
5Because our panel is unbalanced, the within and between standard deviations do not sum to the overall standard
deviation.
6In Table 4, there are less observations for PrTravel and PuTravel than other variables. The reason is that InfoMap
16Only gender is a time-invariant variable, and the within variation equals to zero. Travel time comes out
with some within variation due to 13 GPs having moved practices between municipalities during our data
period. Finally, the patient composition variable shows variations over time.
5 Empirical Analysis and Results
We now use data described in Section 4 to test the predictions from the model in Section 3. For econometric
analysis, the Norwegian list patient system has several advantages. There is almost complete patient and
GP participation under Norwegian National Health Insurance. Self-selection into the system is unlikely to
be a problem. We also know a GP’s practice size. This allows us to standardize a GP’s practice, so that
comparing the number of referrals of GPs whose practices have diﬀerent numbers of patients is meaningful.
Physicians’ fees from National Insurance and patient copayments are outcomes of negotiation between the
state and the Norwegian Medical Association, and uniform among all GPs. At the municipality level, market
conditions therefore do not inﬂuence a GP’s fees.
Our data consist of radiology referrals made by a panel of doctors over a period of forty eight months.
Unobserved heterogeneity among GPs is likely because our data cannot possibly include all relevant factors
that inﬂuence referral decisions. Unobserved heterogeneity violates the assumptions of ordinary least squares
regression because error terms of diﬀerent periods may be correlated for a GP.
Using the index i to refer to GP, and t to refer to time period (a month), we ﬁt a standard model:
yit = αi + xitβ + ziγ +  it (i =1 ,....,4265; t =1 ,....,48).
The dependent variable yit is the i-th GP’s radiology referral rate in the t-th period. The independent
variable xit is a vector of GP and time varying explanatory variables, while zi is a vector of GP speciﬁc, time
invariant variables. The vectors of coeﬃcients to be estimated are β and γ. To allow for GP heterogeneity,
we let αi + it be a stochastic error term. The stochastic variable αi is the GP speciﬁc random variable that
Norge AS provided the travel time information for 2002, but since then a number of municipalities merged, so the
software could not provide information for new municipalities.
17captures unobserved heterogeneity. It diﬀers among GPs, but is constant for a GP over time. We assume
E( it)=0 Var( it)=σ2
  Cov( it,  is)=0
E(αi)=0 Var(αi)=σ2
α Cov(αi,  it)=0
For the random-eﬀects model to be valid, we need to have
Cov(αi,x it)=Cov(αi,z i)=0 .
We test these two restrictions by a Hausman test. If the restriction is rejected, the ﬁxed-eﬀects model
is selected. In the ﬁxed-eﬀects model αi cancels, so the model is robust. When they are valid, random-
eﬀects estimators are more eﬃcient than the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimators. In addition, we can test for eﬀects of
time-invariant variables.
Our study focuses on market conditions. Two variables in our data set can serve to identify the extent
of market competition, the parameter θ in Section 3. The ﬁrst, #Capacity,i st h en u m b e ro fG P si na
municipality who accept new patients.7 The second, %Capacity, is the proportion of GPs in a municipality
who accept new patients. The variable #Capacity correlates with the opportunity set available to a patient
considering switching from his current GP. When #Capacity is high, a patient should be able to switch
between GPs more easily, and we interpret naturally that higher #Capacity is more intense competition.
Larger municipalities likely have larger values of #Capacity. Nevertheless, longer travel distances between
patients and GPs in larger municipalities may overstate the extent of competition. The variable %Capacity
is a sort of standardized measure of competition, so it may well control for some municipality size eﬀect. In
t h ea n a l y s i sw eu s e#Capacity. W eh a v ea l s or u nt h er e g r e s s i o n sw i t h%Capacity. The sign of the eﬀect
is not aﬀected, but the null hypothesis in the Hausman test has been rejected more often. We argue that
#Capacity is predetermined because the number of GPs with open lists is arguably predetermined when
referral decisions are being made. Geographical variations in the numbers of open lists are largely explained
by variations in GP density prior to the introduction of the regular GP scheme in 2001. Referral decisions
within a time period do not aﬀect the number of open lists in the market within the same time period.
Finally, our model yields predictions about referral rates depending on whether GPs face patient shortage,
7We deﬁne #Capacity as the number of GPs in a municipality with open lists minus 1 if the GP has patient
shortage; otherwise it is equal to the number of GPs with open lists.
18so we include the variable Short as deﬁned in Table 4
[Table 5 about here.]
Results from the estimations of factors that inﬂuence a GP’s referral rate to private radiology, PrReferral,
are in Table 5. (In all tables, estimates that are signiﬁcant at 5 percent are superscripted by *, and 1 percent
by **.) Because the proportion of elderly in a GP’s practice (Propold) and the GP’s age (Age) show nonlinear
relationships to PrReferral, we convert these two variables into dummy variables. For Propold groups are
determined according to 10-th, 50-th and 95-th percentiles. We also have considered alternative groupings,
but these have not changed regression results. Age is grouped according to the 75 percentile.
In Table 5 results are ﬁrst presented for an Ordinary Least Squares regression, then a ﬁxed-eﬀects
regression, and ﬁnally a random-eﬀects regression. From the Hausman test, the null hypothesis of zero
correlation between the explanatory variables and the individual stochastic term is not rejected at the
conventional, 5 percent level. Hence, we describe the results from the random eﬀects model.
Signs of estimates are as one would naturally expect. Referral rate increases with a patient’s age and with
the proportion of females in a GP’s practice. Male GPs and older GPs refer more. GPs who experience a
shortage of patients are estimated to have a referral rate 0.58 per 1000 listed patients greater than GPs with
enough patients. Since the mean referral rate per 1000 listed patients is 11.8 per 1000 patients for GPs with
enough patients, patient shortage contributes to a 4.9 percent increase in the referral rate. The estimated
magnitude of the eﬀect of #Capacity is 0.021. Some impression of the magnitude of this eﬀect is derived as
follows. If we raise the number of GPs who accepts new patients from 0 to 53, which is the 75th percentile,
we will add 1.11 to the referral rate, which is a 9.4 percent increase compared to the mean referral rate.
We have included an interaction term, #Capacity*(1-Short), as an explanatory variable. The estimated
coeﬃcient assigned to the interaction term indicates the eﬀect of capacity in the municipality for a GP with
enough patients compared to a GP with patient shortage. Since competition is less of a threat for GPs with
enough patients, we expect a negative estimate from this interaction term. From Table 5 this eﬀect is indeed
negative, but not statistically signiﬁcant.
19[Table 6 about here.]
We check the robustness of the basic model by alternative estimation methods. First, GPs are clustered
in municipalities, and GPs in the same municipality may develop their own professional culture of radiology
referrals. This unobserved heterogeneity can be modelled in two ways. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, we introduce
a dummy for each municipality. In the second speciﬁcation, we introduce the municipality level as a third
level with the random intercepts for GPs nested within the random intercepts for municipalities. Similar
to the random intercept for the GP, we assume that the random intercept for a municipality has a zero
expectation and a constant variance. In addition we assume that the random intercepts and residual error
terms are mutually independent. From Table 6, neither signs nor magnitudes of the estimated coeﬃcients of
Short (0.46) nor #Capacity (0.023) are changed much. We have found a statistically signiﬁcant municipality
random eﬀect.
[Table 7 about here.]
Second, we divide our data according to the four radiology modalities, and estimate each individually.
The results are in Table 7. We report estimates of the ﬁxed-eﬀects model for X-ray, ultrasound, and MRI,
and the random-eﬀects model for CT Scan; the Hausman test rejects random eﬀects for all but CT Scan. We
have dropped the interaction term because it was not statistically signiﬁcant. From Table 7 the estimated
coeﬃcients of both Short and #Capacity are positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent level.
As expected, the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients are smaller compared to the aggregate model where all
modalities are put together. The absolute eﬀects of Short are larger for X-ray and MRI. Evaluated at the
mean referral rate of each modality the relative eﬀect of short is about ﬁve percent for each modality, except
for CT Scan which is seven percent. The relative eﬀect of #Capacity varies more according to modalities
with ultrasound showing the largest relative eﬀect and MRI the smallest.
[Table 8 about here.]
Finally, we let referrals to public laboratories and total referrals be dependent variables. These are
normalized in the same way as referrals to private laboratories, at number of referrals in a month per 1000
20listed patients. The Hausman test rejects random eﬀects for both regressions. From Table 8, Short has a
positive eﬀect on referrals to public laboratories. Similar to results in Table 5, Short has a positive eﬀect on
total referrals. The magnitude of the eﬀect is about a ﬁve percent increase calculated from the mean. As
expected, the distance to private laboratories has a positive eﬀect on the referrals to public laboratories but
no eﬀect on the total number of referrals. The #Capacity variable has a negative eﬀect on referrals to public
laboratories. This suggests that on average patients have better access to private than public laboratories.
The eﬀect of #Capacity on the total number of referrals is positive.
As we have mentioned in Section 4, GPs’ referral rates do exhibit some seasonal patterns. To explore
the possible bias due to seasonality, we have run all the regressions with month dummies. The signs and
magnitude of the eﬀects of interest are hardly changed. Clearly, there is no need to remove seasonality
completely by aggregating our data into annual observations. The month dummy implementations yield no
consequences, and aggregation will cause us to lose too much information.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Gatekeeping is an integral part of managed care. General Practitioners, being primary care physicians, are
frontline gatekeepers. In this paper, we examine how GPs’ radiology referrals respond to market competition.
When there are more available GPs in the market, a GP tends to refer more patients for radiology diagnostic
tests. Using Norwegian data of GP radiology referrals, we show that the increase is statistically signiﬁcant
and modest. We have also shown that results are robust. Dividing our data into diﬀerent modalities (X-ray,
Ultrasound, MRI and CAT Scan), and allowing for municipality-location eﬀects do not change our results.
Our results have important policy implications. Substituting secondary care by primary care is believed to
be cost-saving by policy makers. The cost reduction due to this substitution seems quite obvious: primary
care is less costly than specialty care. Nevertheless, increasing the number of GPs makes the primary
physician market more competitive. Together with a capitation payment for a patient-list system, as in
Norway, more GPs may experience patient shortage from the more intense competition. Our theoretical
model shows that this may lead to more referrals, and our empirical results support that. Against more
21competition, GPs reoptimize by referring patients more often, responding positively to patient requests. The
cost saving eﬀect may be weakened by GPs’ reactions.
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Figure 1: Travel time and referral rates
Lab Type Year
2004 (39735) 2005 (41552) 2006 (41836) 2007 (42638)
Private 11.1 11.6 12.1 13.1
Public 2.8 7.6 8.4 8.9
Total 13.9 19.2 20.5 22.0
Table 1: Monthly referral rates per 1000 listed patients, by years and laboratory types (# obs. in parenthesis)
Median (165716) 50th to 75th% (41249) 75th to 90th% (26372) Over 90th% (16970)
Private 12.0 12.3 15.0 20.6
Public 7.0 7.3 3.1 0.8
Total 19.0 19.6 18.1 21.4
Table 2: Monthly referral rates per 1000 listed patients, by percentiles of open practices in municipality (#
obs. in parenthesis)




Table 3: Monthly referral rates per 1000 listed patients, by patient shortage (# obs. in parenthesis)





Referral No. referrals in a month per 1000
listed patients
19.0 12.5 9.1 9.1 0 500
PrReferral No. referrals in a month per 1000
listed patients to private provider
12.0 10.1 8.4 6.1 0 500
PuReferral No. referrals in a month per 1000
listed patients to public provider
7.0 9.9 7.8 6.4 0 249
List Practice size in units of 1000 pa-
tients
1.235 0.390 0.399 0.081 0.09 2.712
Propold Proportion of persons in the list
aged 70 and older
0.11 0.06 0.06 0.009 0.001 0.68
Propfem Proportion of females in the list 0.51 0.10 0.10 0.012 0.09 0.90
Male Dummy variable equal to one if
the physician is male
0.70 0.46 0.46 0 0 1
Age GP’s age in years in 2001 48.0 9.41 10.2 1.13 26 75
Short Proportion of GPs with (pre-
ferred - actual list) ≥ 100
0.24 0.43 0.40 0.21 0 1
#Capacity No. GPs in municipality who ac-
cept new patients
74.5 129.4 124.5 7.8 0 422
%Capacity Proportion GPs in municipality
who accept new patients
0.81 0.15 0.12 0.09 0 1
PrTravel Travel time in hours by car from
GP’s municipality to nearest pri-
vate laboratory’s municipality
1.04 2.00 2.21 0.17 0 18.42
PuTravel Travel time in hours by car from
GP’s municipality to nearest pub-
lic laboratory’s municipality
0.40 0.71 0.82 0.09 0 6.37
Table 4: Variable deﬁnitions and deacriptives. There are 165425 observations for each variable, except the
last two. There are 165283 observations for each of PrTravel and PuTravel.
26PrReferral
OLS Fixed eﬀects Random eﬀects
Propfem 5.07∗∗(0.33) 9.56∗∗(1.24) 7.82∗∗(0.96)
0.042<Propold≤0.105 0.80∗∗(0.08) 0.77∗∗(0.14) 0.80∗∗(0.13)
0.105<Propold≤0.217 1.35∗∗(0.08) 1.00∗∗(0.17) 1.07∗∗(0.16)
0.217<Propold 2.21∗∗(0.13) 1.96∗∗(0.26) 2.01∗∗(0.24)
Male 1.20∗∗(0.07) 1.57∗∗(0.27)
55≤Age 0.65∗∗(0.05) 0.092 (0.097) 0.16∗∗(0.09)
Short 0.52∗∗(0.06) 0.57∗∗(0.08) 0.58∗∗ (0.08)
#Capacity 0.022∗∗(0.0003) 0.016∗∗(0.0002) 0.021∗∗(0.00008)
#Capacity*(1-Short) 0.003∗∗(0.0004) -0.0009 (0.0005) -0.0005 (0.0005)
PrTravel -1.58∗∗(0.01) -1.57∗∗(0.10) -1.52∗∗(0.05)
PuTravel 0.58∗∗(0.04) 0.58∗(0.20) 0.54∗∗(0.13)
Constant 8.23∗∗(0.2) 7.59∗∗(0.67) 6.84∗∗(0.62)
Dummies for years Yes Yes Yes
Dummies for municipalities No No No
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.20 0.21
No.observations 165092 165092 165092
No.GPs 4261 4261







Table 5: Estimated eﬀect (robust std) of practice characteristics and market conditions on the monthly
number of referrals to private laboratories per 1000 listed patients
PrReferral






55≤Age 0.11 (0.10) 0.24∗∗(0.09)
Short 0.46∗∗(0.08) 0.45∗∗(0.08)
#Capacity 0.023∗∗(0.004) 0.025∗∗(0.003)
#Capacity*(1-Short) -0.0012∗ (0.0005) -0.0006 (0.0005)
PrTravel -1.71 (1.65) -1.15∗∗(0.11)
PuTravel 0.21 (4.82) 0.31(0.31)
Constant 4.53∗∗(1.30) 5.95∗∗(0.67)
Dummies for years Yes Yes




No.observations per GP Min:1;Avg:38.7; Max:48 Min:1;Avg:38.7; Max:48
Var at municipality level 4.64 (0.20)
Hausman test χ2(136)=691.08;p=0.000
Table 6: Estimated eﬀect (robust std) of practice characteristics and market conditions on the monthly
number of referrals to private laboratories per 1000 listed patients adjusted for the municipality level
27PrReferral
X-ray Ultrasound MRI CT Scan
(ﬁxed eﬀects) (ﬁxed eﬀects) (ﬁxed eﬀects) (random eﬀects)
Short 0.28∗∗(0.04) 0.07∗∗(0.015) 0.19∗∗ (0.03) 0.10∗∗(0.02)
#Capacity 0.011∗∗(0.001) 0.043∗∗(0.004) 0.001∗∗(0.0008) 0.004∗∗(0.0001)
PrTravel -0.74∗∗(0.05) -0.16∗∗(0.023) -0.47∗∗(0.04) -0.20∗∗(0.009)
PuTravel 0.37∗∗(0.11) 0.03 (0.05) 0.16 (0.09) 0.04 (0.03)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality dummy No No No
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.12 0.07 0.13
Observations 165092 165092 165092 165092
GPs 4261 4261 4261 4261
Observations/GP Min:1;Avg:38.7; Min:1;Avg:38.7; Min:1;Avg:38.7; Min:1;Avg:38.7;






Hausman test χ2(12)=25.80; χ2(12)=28.71; χ2(12)=41.54; χ2(12)=16.63;
p=0.011 p=0.004 p=0.000 p=0.16
Table 7: Estimated eﬀect (robust std) of practice characteristics and market conditions on the monthly
number of referrals to private laboratories according to modalities per 1000 listed patients
PuReferral Referral
Fixed eﬀects Fixed eﬀects












Dummies for years Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.07
No. observations 165092 165092
No. GPs 4261 4261
No. observations per GP Min:1;Avg:38.7; Max:48 Min:1;Avg:38.7; Max:48
Hausman test χ2(13)=129.42; p=0.000 χ2(13)=116.85; p=0.000
Table 8: Estimated eﬀect (robust std) of practice characteristics and market conditions on the monthly
number of referrals to public laboratories and total number of referrals per 1000 listed patients
28